



MLAG

10-12 April 2019

FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES | UNIVERSITY OF PORTO

**GRADUATE
CONFERENCE III**

Table of Contents

Organizing Committee	1
Scientific Committee	2
Keynote speakers and participants	4
Abstracts	7
Programme	20

* * *

Wi-fi: UPorto

Login: eventosflup

Password: conference

* * *

Organizing Committee

- Prof. Sofia Miguens (University of Porto)
- Prof. João Alberto Pinto (University of Porto)
- Dr. Luca Corti (University of Porto)
- Diana Couto (University of Barcelona)
- José Pedro Correia (University of Porto)
- João Silva (University of Porto)

Administrative staff:

- Isabel Marques (Institute of Philosophy – University of Porto)

Scientific Committee

- **Prof. Alberto Voltolini** (University of Turin)
- **Dr. Ana Falcato** (New University of Lisbon)
- **Dr. Andrea Giananti** (University of Fribourg)
- **Prof. Andrei Moldovan** (University of Salamanca)
- **Dr. Anna Ciaunica** (University of Porto)
- **Dr. Bianca Cepollaro** (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele)
- **Prof. Brena Fernandez** (Federal University of Santa Catarina)
- **Dr. Bruno Ambroise** (Paris-Sorbonne University)
- **Prof. Célia Teixeira** (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)
- **Prof. Charles Travis** (King's College London/University of Porto)
- **Dr. Dan Zeman** (University of Vienna)
- **Dr. David Lobina** (University of Barcelona)
- **Prof. David Pineda** (University of Girona)
- **Dr. David Yates** (University of Lisbon)
- **Dr. David Zaperó** (University of Bonn)
- **Dr. Eduardo Marchesan** (University of São Paulo)
- **Dr. Elia Zardini** (University of Lisbon)
- **Dr. Elmar Unnsteinsson** (University College Dublin)
- **Dr. Erich Rast** (New University of Lisbon)
- **Prof. Eylem Özaltun** (Koç University)
- **Prof. Francisco Pereira** (Alberto Hurtado University)
- **Prof. Gabriele Mras** (University of Vienna)
- **Prof. Giorgio Volpe** (University of Bologna)
- **Dr. Giovanni Merlo** (University of Stirling)
- **Prof. Hichem Naar** (University of Duisburg-Essen)
- **Prof. Javier González de Prado Salas** (UNED, Spain)
- **Prof. Jérôme Dokic** (Institut Jean-Nicod, EHSS)
- **Prof. Jesús Navarro** (University of Sevilla)

- **Dr. Klaus Gärtner** (University of Lisbon)
- **Dr. Laura Delgado** (University of Barcelona)
- **Dr. Lorenzo Rossi** (University of Salzburg)
- **Dr. Luca Corti** (University of Porto)
- **Prof. João Alberto Pinto** (University of Porto)
- **Prof. Manuel de Pinedo** (University of Granada)
- **Prof. Marc Artiga** (University of Valencia)
- **Prof. Mattia Riccardi** (University of Porto)
- **Dr. Miguel Angel Sebastián** (National Autonomous U. Mexico)
- **Prof. Mona Simion** (University of Glasgow)
- **Prof. Pablo Rychter** (University of Valencia)
- **Prof. Pedro Galvão** (University of Lisbon)
- **Prof. Pedro Santos** (University of Algarve)
- **Prof. Ricardo Santos** (University of Lisbon)
- **Prof. Sofia Miguens** (University of Porto)
- **Prof. Sònia Roca Royes** (University of Stirling)
- **Dr. Susana Cadilha** (New University of Lisbon)
- **Prof. Tim Kenyon** (Brock University)
- **Dr. Víctor Fernández** (Institut Jean Nicod)
- **Prof. Vittorio Morato** (University of Padova)

Warm thanks to everyone!

Keynote speakers

Clayton Littlejohn

Clayton Littlejohn is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London. He works in epistemology and is particularly interested in understanding the connections between practical and theoretical reason. He published his first book, *Justification and the Truth-Connection*, in 2012 and is presently working on a book about knowledge-first epistemology.

Webpage: <https://claytonlittlejohn.com/>.

Sofia Miguens

Sofia Miguens is Professor at the University of Porto. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Daniel Dennett's theory of mind, seen against the background of discussions of Fodor, Putnam, Quine and Wittgenstein (2002, *A Physicalist Theory of Content and Consciousness*). She is also author of *Rationality* (2004), *Is my Mind inside my Head?* (2008), *Philosophy of Language – an introduction* (2007), *Understanding Mind and Knowledge* (2008), *John McDowell – an Analysis from the Viewpoint of Moral Philosophy* (2014) and *A Reading of Contemporary Philosophy – Figures and Movements* (2019). As head of Contemporary Philosophy and of the Mind, Language, and Action Group (MLAG) at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto she has also edited many books, the last of which *The Logical Alien* (Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2019). In general the projects of MLAG, the research group she created in 2005, focus on questions of mind (e.g. perception, rationality, hallucination, natural and artificial intelligence, judgement, etc).

Webpage: <https://up-pt.academia.edu/SofiaMiguensTravis>.

Nuno Venturinha

Nuno Venturinha (PhD Lisbon, 2006) is currently Deputy Head of the Philosophy Department and Director of the MA Program in Philosophy at the NOVA University of Lisbon. He has also taught as a visiting lecturer at the University of Lisbon, as a visiting professor at the Universities of São Paulo and Valencia, and as a summer session visiting professor at the University of Siena. He has been a visiting researcher on various occasions at the Universities of Bergen, Cambridge, Helsinki, Innsbruck and Oxford. In addition, he has been a guest lecturer and invited conference speaker at numerous universities in Austria, Brazil, England, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain and Wales. He often addresses general audiences and has been a regular guest speaker at the Horasis Global Meeting. He is Principal Investigator on the FCT-funded project Epistemology of Religious Belief: Wittgenstein, Grammar and the Contemporary World. He is the author of *Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology* (Springer, 2018) as well as the editor of *Wittgenstein After His Nachlass* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and *The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (Routledge, 2013).

Webpage: <https://www.ifilnova.pt/en/pages/nuno-venturinha>.

Speakers

- **Alice Huang** (New York University)
- **Anaïs Jomat** (Saint-Louis University)
- **Andrea Raimondi** (Northwestern Italian Philosophy Consortium)
- **Andrea Rivadulla Duró** (University of Barcelona)
- **Bartłomiej Czajka** (University of Barcelona)
- **Dario Mortini** (University of Glasgow)
- **Giorgio Mazzullo** (University of Nottingham)
- **Hien Bui** (University of Oxford)
- **Jordi Fairhurst** (University of the Balearic Islands)
- **Marco Facchin** (Univ. School for Advanced Studies IUSS Pavia)
- **Michael Bruckner** (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
- **Ninni Suni** (University of Helsinki)
- **Sarah Fisher** (University of Reading)
- **Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette** (University of Oxford)
- **Tamaz Tokhadze** (University of Sussex)

Discussants

- **Anna Ciaunica** (University of Porto)
- **Andrea Raimondi** (Northwestern Italian Philosophy Consortium)
- **Diana Couto** (University of Barcelona)
- **Bartłomiej Czajka** (University of Barcelona)
- **Dario Mortini** (University of Glasgow)
- **José Pedro Correia** (University of Porto)
- **Hien Bui** (University of Oxford)
- **Luca Corti** (University of Porto)
- **Manuela Teles** (University of Porto)
- **Mattia Riccardi** (University of Porto)
- **Michael Bruckner** (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
- **Lisa Vogt** (University of Barcelona)
- **Madeleine Hyde** (Stockholm University)
- **Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette** (University of Oxford)
- **Tamaz Tokhadze** (University of Sussex)

Abstracts

Clayton Littlejohn | *Second Thoughts on (Subjective) Epistemic Rightness*

In this paper, I aim to do three things. The first is to show that knowledge is normatively central in epistemology. The second is to show that indirect theories of justification are problematic because they either draw the justification-excuse distinction in the wrong place or they sever the connection between the justification of belief and the justification of that which belief rationalises. The third is to discuss a new approach to excusable norm violation that's modelled on some recent work on subjective rightness. One of the virtues of this new approach is that it helps us understand why we sometimes ought (in a way) do what we know we ought not do.

Sofia Miguens | *Apperception or Environment: The McDowell-Travis Debate on the Nature of Perceptual Judgement*

Within current philosophy of perception John McDowell has for quite some time been defending a view inspired by Kant (McDowell 1994, McDowell 2009, McDowell 2013). Charles Travis opposes such view and counters it with his own, Frege-inspired, approach (Travis 2013, Travis 2014, Travis forthcoming). My talk aims to characterize the core of their debate on the nature of perceptual judgement. One purpose is to bring out what being a Kantian might ultimately amount to, and where criticisms to such position might come from, in debates where general questions concerning representation, consciousness and appearances (and thus metaphysical questions concerning thought-world relations) are concerned.

Nuno Venturinha | *Contextualism, Hinge Epistemology and the Primacy of Action*

In this lecture, I shall begin by addressing the “relevant alternatives” theory of knowledge and some classical contextualist views, namely those of Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose. My initial aim will be to show that the appeal to defeasibility, i.e. the possibility of ruling out defeaters to our knowledge-claims, does not solve all the problems posed by scepticism in its most radical form. Next, I discuss Richard Feldman’s and Crispin Wright’s incompatibilist critiques of epistemic contextualism, paying special attention to David Lewis’ elusiveness thesis. I then turn to Wittgenstein’s conception of hinge propositions in *On Certainty* and explore central themes of Duncan Pritchard’s account of “hinge epistemology”. I call attention to the eminently empirical character of our “hinges” and consider Pritchard’s notion of “arational hinge commitments”, more specifically his distinction between the pair “über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and the pair “personal hinge commitments”/“personal hinge propositions”. I also examine another pair of notions introduced by Pritchard, namely “anti-skeptical hinge commitments”/“anti-skeptical hinge propositions”. I conclude with a re-evaluation of the diagnosis made by Pritchard that, confronted with a sceptical scenario, our “epistemic angst” can be surpassed if we follow Wittgenstein’s teaching in *On Certainty* about the “structure of rational evaluation”, but that an “epistemic vertigo” can never be ultimately dispelled. My argument is that in a practical scenario there is no room for vertigo.

Alice Huang | *Gerrymandering ‘Structure’: On the Absolute Intrinsicity Interpretation*

The ‘structure and dynamics argument’ has been used to argue against materialism of consciousness. Whether or not the argument succeeds depends on gerrymandering the interpretation of ‘structure.’ The argument requires at least two things: (1) that all physical facts are

structural-dynamical, and (2) that at least some mental facts are non-structural-dynamical. But what are ‘structures’? The interpretation put forth by Derk Pereboom is considered to be a promising one: On his construal, ‘structural’ facts are about extrinsic properties or what he defines as comparatively intrinsic properties. ‘Non-structural’ facts are about absolutely intrinsic properties. Upon close examination, however, his original definition of comparatively and absolutely intrinsic properties, stated in terms of necessitation, renders mental facts structural, failing the second requirement. This issue can be resolved by redefining comparatively and absolutely intrinsic properties in terms of grounding. In the second part of the paper, I argue that even with the grounding framework, Pereboom’s interpretation fails to satisfy the first requirement. There are ‘non-structural-dynamical’ physical facts. I raise two fundamental physical truths that are non-structural-dynamical on Pereboom’s interpretation, drawing from facts about charm quarks and Einstein’s account of gravitation in General Relativity. I conclude that the structure and dynamics argument fails on Pereboom’s construal.

Anaïs Jomat | *“Getting Us out of It”: Excuses and Responsibility in Action*

As opposed to justifications, excuses are usually said to be a type of defense which “extenuates” or “mitigates” our responsibility, since they represent a claim for not having done, or not fully or completely done, the action we are accused of: the deed might have been performed under duress, or by mistake, or with another intention in mind, etc. Yet, excuses do not always “get us out of it”: depending on the circumstances, pleading clumsiness or thoughtlessness might aggravate one’s case, and thus increase one’s responsibility. Now, considered as ordinary linguistic practices, what do excuses show us about the degree to which our actions can be said to be ours? Drawing upon J. L. Austin’s famous essay “A Plea for Excuses”, this paper endeavors to give a non-moral account of the relationship between responsibility and excuses. My claim is that responsibility, rather than

being an answer to a yes/no question, is a dimension of assessment that is dependent on the descriptions under which we consider our actions.

Andrea Raimondi | *Neither Use nor Mention*

Quotation is our primary metalinguistic tool: for instance, we use it to talk about graphematic properties of expressions ('House' has four letters'), their phonetic properties ('Pray' is pronounced as 'prey'), and grammatical features of languages ('The' is the definite article in English'). But the use of quotation is not theoretically essential: we can engage with metalinguistic discourse without resorting to mentioning, but rather by using our expressions with their conventional meaning. For example, using descriptive expressions of 'cut', we might rephrase 'Cut' is monosyllabic' as 'The word composed successively of the third, the twenty-first, and the twentieth letters of the alphabet is monosyllabic'.

In this paper, I argue that there is a peculiar metalinguistic usage that does not rely on mention, nor on use. This usage is represented by meaning ascriptions, i.e., sentences that attribute meanings to linguistic expressions. A paradigmatic example of meaning ascription is 'Neige' means snow'. While 'neige' is mentioned, the status of 'snow' is puzzling: speakers might disagree on whether or not to put quotation marks around it, and, as a matter of fact, many philosophers choose an alternative punctuation device (see Kaplan 1969, Sellars 1974, Field 2016). I contend that the reason why the object term appears to have a puzzling status is that it is neither used nor mentioned. Firstly, I show that an analysis that treats the object term as used provides ungrammatical results. Secondly, I put forth four arguments against an analysis that treats it as mentioned. Finally, I suggest that the result of my arguments calls for a critical reconsideration of the traditional use/mention distinction, and I sketch the general lines of two alternative analyses.

Andrea Rivadulla Duró | *On the Phenomenological Distinction between Episodic Remembering and Experiential Imagining: An Argument against the Inclusion View*

In the recent years, a new trend in cognitive science about the metaphysics of mental states seems to be emerging. It is the one of considering episodic memory not as a mental state in itself, but rather as a certain way of imagining the past (Hopkins, 2018; Michaelian et al., forthcoming) being therefore reducible to imagination. In the present paper I briefly present the motivations of such views, and expose an argument against one of them (Hopkins's Inclusion View, 2018) according to which episodic remembering is imagining controlled by the past (2018: 47). My attempt here is to show that there is an important phenomenological difference between remembering and imagining (which is in fact the one that let the subject distinguish between them both), and that the Inclusion View cannot account for it. In order to show this, along the paper I'll attempt to make the Inclusion view compatible with some of the candidates for explaining this phenomenological difference—the so-called memory markers. I'll conclude that none of them can be used by the Inclusion theorist, who leaves unexplained the fact that we are able to differentiate between memory and imagination. As a final point, I take this incompatibility to gives us reasons to keep treating episodic memory and imagination as different mental states.

Bartłomiej Czajka | *Can Normative Reasons Motivate?*

In this paper, I investigate two notions of reasons for action used in philosophy. The first one is objectivist: reasons are what determine obligations and the best actions to do in given circumstances. They are normative reasons. The second one is subjectivist: reasons are what people take into consideration in reasoning about what to do. They are motivating reasons. Many philosophers argue that reasons in the objectivist sense are facts (Alvarez, 2010, 2018; Hawthorne and Magidor, 2018; Hawthorne and Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2017). This

comes from the widely accepted claim that in order to make some action right, a proposition must be true. In this paper, I analyse the relationship between normative reasons and actions they support. I argue that to be fit to the task of determining obligations and right actions, normative reasons must yield monotonic support, viz. support that cannot be defeated by adding more relevant facts into the picture. Therefore, a normative reason must not only be true. It must also be a conjunction of all facts relevant to the choice situation. I discuss the recent perspectivalist view, according to which support can be non-monotonic—it can be given by a proper subset of normative reasons, i.e. known normative reasons (Lord, 2017; Kiesewetter, 2017). I argue that perspectivalism faces a form of arbitrariness objection.

At the end of the paper, I sketch three difficulties this result raises for another, intuitively plausible claim: that we often are motivated by normative reasons, thus the normative and motivating reasons are the same propositions.

Dario Mortini | *Knowledge-first Metaphysical Credentials*

In recent joint work, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup (2017) have levelled a novel objection against knowledge-first epistemology. Their arguments hinge on supervenience, and purportedly cast doubt on knowledge-first metaphysical credentials: roughly, the two contend that putting knowledge first essentially hinders the satisfaction of a plausible (and elsewhere accepted) supervenience requirement placed on epistemic properties. Pace Pritchard and Kallestrup, in this paper I set out to show that knowledge firsters have the resources to satisfy such requirement without giving up on their core commitments.

My plan is as follows. First off, I split their objection into three different parts: the base properties problem, the superdupervenience requirement and the failure of priority. Then, I proceed to show that all of them ultimately fail. While the base properties problem is suitably addressed by insisting that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, the superdupervenience requirement is fairly more complex, and therefore deserves special treatment. Accordingly, I develop two

different lines of response — a refusal and an acceptance line. The former rejects the requirement in light of implicit reductionist assumptions; the latter provides a superdupervenience in terms of identity and metaphysical grounding. Finally, I fend off the last strand of their objection by distinguishing between conceptual and metaphysical priority of knowledge. As such, my conclusion will be that knowledge firsters have strong metaphysical credentials, and that supervenience does not make any trouble for their project.

Giorgio Mazzullo | *No Spontaneous Imaginings*

The distinctive form of imagination which involves mental imagery as a proper part is usually called sensory imagination. According to the Standard Theory (Walton 1990; O'Shaughnessy 2000; Nanay 2016), sensory imaginings can be deliberate and spontaneous. These two categories are not thought to be discrete. Paradigm instances of sensory imaginings might typically combine spontaneous and deliberative aspects. My aim in this paper is to show that we should amend the Standard Theory. Even though we tend to classify both as instances of sensory imagination, full spontaneous imaginings are not imaginings at all. I will argue in favour of this claim by showing that paradigm cases of alleged full spontaneous imaginings fail to meet the conditions necessary to be considered as sensory imaginings. Consequently, I will provide a provisional account of sensory imaginings. According to it, sensory imaginings are instances of imaginative intentional actions, and their intentional origin is reflected in their distinctive phenomenology. Full spontaneous imaginings are not intentional actions and do not possess this distinctive phenomenology. Hence, we should consider them as episodes of spontaneous imagery. Finally, I will consider and offer a rejoinder to a potential counter-argument based on a modified version of the causal-argument set forth by Robinson (1994) against disjunctive theories of perception.

Hien Bui | *We are Rarely Free: In Defense of Restrictivism*

Restrictivism, or restrictive incompatibilism, is the thesis that given incompatibilism, we are rarely free in our actions. Its defenders include Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan. It, however, faces several objections. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza claim that the paradigm cases which are vital to arguments for restrictivism, in which an agent is not able to perform X, are actually cases in which the agent can in fact perform X. Gordon Petit claims that there's reason to believe we can't ever prove that these free actions are rare. Eddy Nahmias claims that a case of an agent confident in her actions demonstrates that an agent need not face a "close call" between 2 or more alternatives in order to be free, a claim inconsistent with a crucial assumption of restrictivism. In this paper, I explain and defend restrictivism against these three objections.

Jordi Fairhurst | *Truth, Belief and Ethics: Wittgenstein's Moral Non-Cognitivism in his Later Work*

It is a widespread view (see e.g. Harman 2000; Lovibond 1983; McDowell 1998; Loobuyck 2005; Brandhorst 2015; 2017; De Mesel 2017) that Wittgenstein, in his later work (e.g. Rhee 1965; Wittgenstein 1953; 1969; 1979; 1980; 1990; Wittgenstein Rhee & Citron 2015), is committed to moral cognitivism, i.e. he claims that moral sentences express beliefs and are apt for truth and falsity. My aim in this paper is to argue against this view, and demonstrate that Wittgenstein is committed to the two theses that constitute moral non-cognitivism: semantic non-factualism (i.e. that moral sentences do not represent facts, express propositions or are truth-apt) and moral non-cognitivism (i.e. that moral utterances do not express beliefs).

Marco Facchin | *Can “Basic Minds” Ever Meet Content? A Problem for Radical Enactivism*

Enactivism argues that cognition should be understood as dynamical agent-environment interactions. Radical Enactivism, however, adds that those interactions are usually contentless, involving mental content only in a special, and limited, set of cases. To account for these special cases, Radical Enactivism resorts to Natural Origins of Content (i. e. NOC): a research program designed to account for the emergence of content and its involvement within per se contentless agent-environment interactions. Here, I'll briefly introduce Radical Enactivism (§1) and NOC (§2), showing it to be an important and praiseworthy project. However, it suffers from a range of theoretical shortcomings (§3): I will argue that NOC (A) is explanatory far too weak, due to an implicit commitment to a behavioristic conception of basic cognition, and (B) is dramatically unclear about what content involving cognition amounts to. Having done so, I will introduce the Skilled Intentionality Framework (§4), to show how NOC can be improved in a way that not only overcomes those theoretical shortcomings, but also strengthens the very important merits NOC already has. The upshot, however, is far from positive. Since the Skilled Intentionality Framework implies a commitment to content even in minimal cognitive cases, the price NOC has to pay to integrate the needed conceptual resources from the Skilled Intentionality Framework is its own compatibility with Radical Enactivism (§5). I'll conclude suggesting that Radical Enactivism is far too radical for its own sake, and that the time for conceptual radicalism in the sciences of the mind might already be over

Michael Bruckner | *Understanding and Ability: A Reply to Sullivan*

The view that understanding is a species of knowledge is called 'reductionism'. The negation of this view is called 'non-reductionism'. A key argument for non-reductionism is the 'ability argument': certain abilities are constitutive of understanding that no amount of testimonial or textbook knowledge can guarantee (call these the

'abilities'). In a recent paper, Emily Sullivan accuses the ability argument of equivocating cognitive abilities, e.g. the ability to give explanations, and embodied abilities, e.g. the ability to make a clay vase on a potter's wheel. She argues that what makes an ability irreducible to propositional knowledge is a requirement for first-personal tactile experience. Since the abilities are cognitive, they do not require tactile experience. Hence, the ability argument is meant to flounder. My paper defends the ability argument against Sullivan's accusations. I start by devising a counterexample to her central distinction. The ability to read Braille is both cognitive and embodied. I then diagnose the deeper problem of which the Braille example is merely symptomatic: embodiment simply does not matter to the reducibility question. The examples of chicken-sexing (familiar from externalist epistemology) and checkmate-predicting (familiar from neuroscience) suggest that what makes abilities irreducible is the requirement for first-personal experience simpliciter, regardless which kind. Since cognitive abilities require first-personal experience too, Sullivan's objection to the ability argument is toothless.

Ninni Suni | *Epistemic Accountability and Attributionism*

This paper argues that interpreting epistemic accountability in terms of attributionism about responsibility allows us to make sense of epistemic deontology without having to accept doxastic voluntarism. A famous line of criticism against epistemic deontology is that deontological concepts apply only when we have direct voluntary control, and beliefs are not under direct voluntary control. Supporters of epistemic deontology have pursued roughly two different routes in answering the critique. First is to endorse doxastic voluntarism. The view has been widely criticized for misconstruing the role that will and choice play in belief-formation. The second line of argument is to deny that ought implies can in epistemic context. The main insight within this strategy is that in epistemic context, 'ought' refers to standards of evaluation. This doesn't solve the problem, however, because standards of evaluation don't presuppose agency or voluntary control.

Therefore, the strategy cannot account for the prescriptivity of deontological concepts.

I argue that epistemic accountability is grounded in epistemic character, patterns and traits. This brings out a similarity with debates concerning moral responsibility. The traditional, volitionist view of responsibility holds that we are responsible only for actions that we exercise voluntary control over. In recent years this has been contested by authors arguing for attributionist views of responsibility. When applied to the question of epistemic accountability, attributionism succeeds in accommodating the conflicting intuitions: the right to use deontological concepts in epistemic context is earned without having to accept doxastic voluntarism, while not being limited to standards of evaluation either.

Sarah Fisher | *Reframing Implicatures*

Using ‘framing effects’ as a case study, I argue that not all conversational implicatures are calculable. Attribute framing effects arise when utterances of logically equivalent sentences lead hearers to make systematically different judgements (even while the wider context is held constant). For example, a basketball player is typically rated more highly when described using the first frame below, rather than the second (Leong et al, 2017):

1. The player made 60% of his shots.
2. The player missed 40% of his shots.

The ‘reference point hypothesis’ provides a promising account of such effects (Sher and McKenzie, 2006; 2008). The idea is that the explicit use of one of two contradictory predicate expressions (like ‘made...his shots’ or ‘missed...his shots’) signals the abundance of the corresponding property, relative to a contextually salient reference point. Although the account has been dubbed ‘pragmatic’, this has not yet been properly cashed out. Here, I consider whether ‘reference point information’ could be conversationally implicated. Starting from

the traditional Gricean framework, I show that such information is not always calculable, in Grice's sense, but depends instead on a convention of language use. Drawing on Davis (1998) however, I note that the same applies to many other central cases of implicature. I propose widening the category of conversational implicature, to include such non-calculable contents (which nevertheless remain both cancellable and at least minimally governed by the cooperative principle). The typology I end up with provides a satisfactory pragmatic account of framing effects; it remains to be shown whether other applications will require more fine-grained distinctions to be drawn.

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette | *Alternatives and Excuses*

The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only responsible for actions which one could have avoided. Much of the philosophical discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt's widely discussed counterexamples to it. In these scenarios, an agent seems responsible for an unavoidable action because what makes it unavoidable has no influence or effect on the actual course of events. Fifty years of discussion has led philosophers to refine the counterexamples and to polish their rebuttals. Attempts to rally everyone seem hopeless as (largely metaphysical) controversies rage. Still, we can make progress on the issue by asking what our reason for believing PAP is. I suggest an answer: lacking alternatives is a good excuse. If this is right, lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to consider—is a good excuse. Yet, this last principle is subject to counterexamples similar to Frankfurt's— modified cases where an agent would (unbeknownst to him) be shot if he refused to commit a minor offence. In these scenarios, the agent lacks eligible alternatives and yet seems blameworthy. This is true independently of the metaphysical controversies surrounding Frankfurt's cases. It follows that our reason for believing PAP does not withstand scrutiny.

In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement — a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible — are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse: (i) Steadfastness's Core (ii) The Deference Principle. I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. My argument, briefly put, is that one cannot rationally treat peer's opinion as unconditionally relevant to a hypothesis, H, but conditional on the supposition of a disagreement, irrelevant to H. Because Steadfast Views endorse a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, I conclude that Steadfast Views are incoherent.

Programme

Wednesday, April 10

Venue: Sala de Reuniões 1 (Meeting room 1)

- 08:45 – 09:15 Registration
- 09:15 – 09:30 *Opening*
Sofia Miguens (Principal Investigator of MLAG;
Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the U.Porto)
Fernanda Ribeiro (Dean of the Faculty of Arts and
Humanities of the U.Porto)
- 09:30 – 10:30 **Michael Bruckner** | *Understanding and Ability: A
Reply to Sullivan*
Discussant: Dario Mortini
- Coffee-break*
- 10:45 – 11:45 **Tamaz Tokhadze** | *Steadfast Views of Disagreement
are Incoherent*
Discussant: Michael Bruckner
- Break*
- 12:00 – 13:00 **Bartłomiej Czajka** | *Can Normative Reasons Motivate?*
Discussant: Luca Corti
- Lunch break*
- 14:30 – 15:30 **Andrea Raimondi** | *Neither Use nor Mention*
Discussant: Mattia Riccardi
- Break*
- 15:45 – 16:45 **Sarah Fisher** | *Reframing Implicatures*
Discussant: Andrea Raimondi
- Coffee-break*
- 17:15 – 18:15 **Nuno Venturinha** | *Contextualism, Hinge
Epistemology and the Primacy of Action*

Thursday, April 11

Venue: Sala de Reuniões 1 (Meeting room 1)

09:30 – 10:30 **Hien Bui** | *We are Rarely Free: In Defense of Restrictivism*
Discussant: Manuela Teles

Coffee-break

10:45 – 11:45 **Anaïs Jomat** | *“Getting Us out of It”: Some Remarks on Excuses and Responsibility in J. L. Austin*
Discussant: Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette

Break

12:00 – 13:00 **Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette** | *Excuses and Alternatives*
Discussant: Hien Bui

Lunch break

14:30 – 15:30 **Giorgio Mazzullo** | *No Spontaneous Imaginings*
Discussant: Madeleine Hyde

Break

15:45 – 16:45 **Andrea Rivadulla Duró** | *On the Phenomenological Distinction between Episodic Remembering and Experiential Imagining: An Argument against the Inclusion View*
Discussant: Diana Couto

Coffee-break

17:15 – 18:15 **Sofia Miguens** | *Apperception or Environment: The McDowell-Travis Debate on the Nature of Perceptual Judgement*

Friday, April 12

Venue: Sala de Reuniões 1 (Meeting room 1)

09:30 – 10:30 **Marco Facchin** | *Can “Basic Minds” Ever Meet Content? A Problem for Radical Enactivism*
Discussant: Anna Ciaunica

Coffee-break

10:45 – 11:45 **Alice Huang** | *Gerrymandering “Structure”: On the Absolute Intrinsicity Interpretation*
Discussant: Lisa Vogt

Break

12:00 – 13:00 **Jordi Fairhurst** | *Truth, Belief and Ethics: Wittgenstein’s Moral Non-Cognitivism in his Later Work*
Discussant: José Pedro Correia

Lunch break

14:30 – 15:30 **Ninni Suni** | *Epistemic Accountability and Attributionism*
Discussant: Bartłomiej Czajka

Break

15:45 – 16:45 **Dario Mortini** | *Knowledge-first Metaphysical Credentials*
Discussant: Tamaz Tokhadze

Coffee-break

17:15 – 18:15 **Clayton Littlejohn** | *Second Thoughts on (Subjective) Epistemic Rightness*

20:00 *Conference Dinner*

MLAG GRADUATE CONFERENCE III
Faculty of Arts and Humanities – University of Porto
2019

MLAG – Mind, Language and Action Research Group

Institute of Philosophy, University of Porto – FIL/00502

W: www.ifilosofia.up.pt

W: www.gcmlag.wordpress.com / www.mlag.up.pt

E: graduateconference.mlag@gmail.com

E: mlag.porto@gmail.com



mlag

MIND
LANGUAGE
& ACTION
GROUP

FCT

Fundação
para a Ciência
e a Tecnologia



SOCIEDADE
PORTUGUESA
DE FILOSOFIA
ANALÍTICA

