



The Bounds of Judgement—Frege, cognitive agents and human thinkers (PTDC/FIL-FIL/109882/2009)

Scientific Committee

Charles Travis King's College London Sofia Miguens University of Porto João Alberto Pinto University of Porto Quassim Cassam University of Warwick José Luis Falguera University of Santiago de Compostela

Organizing Committee

Charles Travis King's College London Sofia Miguens University of Porto João Alberto Pinto University of Porto Mattia Riccardi University of Porto Susana Cadilha University of Porto João Santos University of Porto

C-MLAG VI



The Bounds of Judgement Frege, cognitive agents and human thinkers

Project tasks: **Frege Father of Disjunctivism** Judging Morally **Articulation and Agency**

Porto 6-7 September 2012

Speakers

Quassim Cassam University of Warwick Naomi Eilan University of Warwick António Marques New University of Lisbon Jean-Philippe Narboux University of Bordeaux Lucy O'Brien University College London Sebastian Rödl Universität Basel

> What shape can our access to the inner take? Can inner experience ever be an object of judgement? Or should we rather think of inner experience in terms of qualia? What, if anything, is wrong with the perceptual model of introspection? And if introspecting is not perceiving, can thinking about perception give us ideas to think about the conditions in which we access ourselves? How does the Frege-Wittgenstein case against idealism bear on conceptions of inner experience?



Starting from such questions we also want to explore ways conceptions of the first-person reflect on approaches to nature of action and morality.