**Citações (3)**

1.“Values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world” (Mackie, p.15)

2.“How could anyone deny that there is a difference between a kind action and a cruel one, or that a coward and a brave man behave differently in the face of danger? Of course, this is undeniable; but it is not to the point. The kinds of behaviour to which moral values and disvalues are ascribed are indeed part of the furniture of the world, and so are the natural, descriptive, differences between them; but not, perhaps, their differences in value. It is a hard fact that cruel actions differ from kind ones (…); but is it an equally hard fact that actions which are cruel in such a descriptive sense are to be condemned?” (Mackie, pp. 16-17)

“Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty--say, causing pain just for fun--and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be `consequential' or 'supervenient'; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in *the world* is signified by this `because'? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which `sees' the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two.” (Mackie, p.41)

3. “To say that there are objective values would not be to say merely that there are some things which are valued by everyone, nor does it entail this. There could be agreement in valuing even if valuing is just something that people do, even if this activity is not further validated. Subjective agreement would give intersubjective values, but intersubjectivity is not objectivity.” (Mackie, p.22)

4. “Someone in a state of moral perplexity, wondering whether it would be wrong for him to engage, say, in research related to bacteriological warfare, wants to arrive at some judgment about this concrete case, his doing this work at this time in these actual circumstances; his relevant characteristics will be part of the subject of the judgment, but no relation between him and the proposes action will be part of the predicate. The question is not, for example whether he really wants to do this work, whether it will satisfy or dissatisfy him, whether he will in the long run have a pro-attitude towards it, or even whether this is an action of a sort that he can happily and sincerely recommend in all relevantly similar cases. Nor is he even wondering just whether to recommend such action in all relevantly similar cases.” (Mackie, p. 33)

5. “So far as ethics is concerned, my thesis that there are no objective values is specifically the denial that any such categorically imperative element is objectively valid. The objective values which I am denying would be action-directing absolutely, not contingently (in the way indicated) upon the agent's desires and inclinations.” (Mackie, p. 29)

6. “If second order ethics were confined, then, to linguistic and conceptual analysis, it ought to conclude that moral values at least are objective: that they are so is part of what our ordinary moral statements mean: the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as of the main line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. But it is precisely for this reason that linguist and conceptual analysis is not enough. The claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language and thought, is not self-validating. It can and should be questioned. But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘error theory’, a theory that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false.” (Mackie, p. 35)

7. “The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.” (Mackie, p. 36)

8. “there would indeed be something weird (…) about the idea of a property that, while retaining the “phenomenal” character of experienced value, was conceived to be part of the world as objectively characterized. It would be as if we tried to construct a conception of amusingness that was fully intelligible otherwise than in terms of the characteristic human responses to what is amusing, but nevertheless contrived somehow to retain the “phenomenal” aspect of amusingness as we experience it in those responses.” (McDowell, p.115)

9. “The idea of the world as it really is involves at least a contrast with that of the world *as it seems to us*: where that contrast implies, not that our conception of the world is totally unrelated to reality, but that it has features which are peculiar to us. By the same token, the world as it really is is contrasted with the world as it peculiarly seems to any observer – that is to say, as it seems to any observer in virtue of that observer’s peculiarities. In using these notions, we are implying that there can be a conception of reality corrected for the special situation or other peculiarity of various observers, and that line of thought leads eventually to a conception of the world as it is independently of the peculiarities of any observers. That, surely, must be identical with a conception which, if we are not idealists, we need: a conception of the world as it is independently of all observers. There is every reason to think that such a conception should leave out secondary qualities.” (Williams, p. 226)

10. “There is a general difficulty about the idea that we can firmly detach subjective properties from objects in the world, eschewing all need for the idea of an object’s really possessing such a property, while retaining the thought that such properties “figure in our experience”, so that we can regard them as projected on to the world from there.” (McDowell, p. 124)

11. “The speaker is expressing demands which he makes as a member of a community, which he has developed in and by participation in a joint way of life; also, what is required of this particular agent would be required of any other in a relevantly similar situation” (Mackie, p. 44)

**Referências:**

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