**Citações:**

1.“Kant’s argument that moral rules have a peculiar and dignified status depends wholly upon his attempt to link moral action with rationality through the mere concept of the form of the law and the principle of universalisability, as interpreted by him. In acting morally Kant thinks that we do as reason dictates. (…) if it could be proved, then any man, whatever his desires, could be shown to have reason to act morally.” (P. Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, nota 15.)

2. Thomas Nagel punha a questão desta forma: faz sentido perguntar ‘porquê fazer aquilo que tenho razão para fazer’? (T. Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism*). Para Nagel, como para McDowell, não.

3. Questionado sobre a possibilidade da acrasia (de não agirmos de acordo com o que pensamos ser melhor, moralmente, neste caso), McDowell diz o seguinte: “the dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with other reasons at all (…). If a situation in which virtue imposes a requirement is genuinely conceived as such (…), then considerations that, in the absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons for acting otherwise are silenced altogether by the requirement.” (p.90)

4. Pensemos em C. Korsgaard, por exemplo. Para ela, se acreditarmos que há algo como a racionalidade prática, então as razões para agir têm que ser capazes de motivar *pessoas racionais*. “Unless reasons are motives, we cannot be said to be practically rational” (MDP, p. 377). Ao contrário de Korsgaard, McDowell fala de capacidades perceptivas e não de capacidades racionais – isto depois leva-o ao problema de saber qual o estatuto do valor (de enquadrá-lo no mundo natural). Para Mcd se o agente não vê que tem uma razão para fazer X, isso não significa que não deliberou correctamente, mas que não teve a educação apropriada.

**Outras citações possivelmente úteis:**

“All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former present the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires (or which one may possibly desire). The categorical imperative would be one which presented an action as of itself objectively necessary, without regard to any other end. (…)

If the action is good only as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; but if it is thought of as good in itself, and hence as necessary in a will which of itself conforms to reason as the principle of this will, the imperative is categorical.” (Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* Sec. II)

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