**Citações (6):**

1. “*Meaning was thus to be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind*. (…) Propositions about matters of fact were assertable if their truth conditions were fulfilled, but moral judgements (…) were essentially linked to an individual speaker’s subjective state.” (P. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, p. 8)
2. “It is surely clear that moral virtues must be connected with human good and harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything you like good or harm.” (P. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, p. 120)
3. “It is obvious that there are objective, factual evaluations of such things as human sight, hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life form of our own species. Why, then, does it seem so monstrous a suggestion that the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and the life of our own species?” (P. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, p. 24)
4. “But mirroring cannot be *both* faithful, so that it adds nothing in the way of intelligible order, *and* such that in moving from what is mirrored to what does the mirroring, one moves from what is brutely alien to the space of *logos* to what is internal to it.” (J. McDowell, p. 179)
5. “Since it is a world, the natural world is not constitutively independent of the structure of subjectivity. It is a mistake to conceive objectivity in terms of complete independence from subjectivity.” (J. McDowell, p. 180)
6. “But it is one thing to recognize that the impersonal stance of scientific investigation is a methodological necessity for the achievement of a valuable mode of understanding reality; it is quite another thing to take the dawning grasp of this, in the modern era, for a metaphysical insight into the notion of objectivity as such, so that objective correctness in any mode of thought must be anchored in this kind of access to the real.” (J. McDowell, p. 182)
7. “The practical intellect does not dictate to one’s formed character – one’s nature as it has become – from outside. One’s formed practical intellect (…) just is an aspect of one’s nature as it has become.” (J. McDowell, p. 185)

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