**Citações** (2)

1. “the internal reasons conception is concerned with the agent’s rationality. What we can correctly ascribe to him in a third-personal internal reason statement is also what he can ascribe to himself as a result of deliberation, as we shall see.”

2. “The sub-Humean model supposes that f-ing has to be related to some element in S as causal means to end (unless, perhaps, it is straightforwardly the carrying out of a desire which is itself that element in S). But this is only one case: indeed, the mere discovery that some course of action is the causal means to an end is not in itself a piece of practical reasoning. **A clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has reason to f because f-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in S,** and this of course is controlled by other elements in S, if not necessarily in a very clear or determinate way. **But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as**: thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, considering which one attaches most weight to (which, importantly, does not imply that there is some one commodity of which they provide varying amounts); or, again, finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment.

**As a result of such processes an agent can come to see that he has reason to do something which he did not see he had reason to do at all.** In this way, the deliberative process can add new actions for which there are internal reasons, just as it can also add new internal reasons for given actions. The deliberative process can also subtract elements from S. **Reflection may lead the agent to see that some belief is false, and hence to realise that he has in fact no reason to do something he thought he had reason to do.”** [sublinhado meu]

3. “More subtly, he may think he has reason to promote some development because he has not exercised his imagination enough about what it would be like if it came about. In his unaided deliberative reason, encouraged by the persuasions of others, he may come to have some more concrete sense of what would be involved, and lose his desire for it, just as, positively, the imagination can create new possibilities and new desires.”

4. “So also it should be more liberal than some theorists have been about the possible elements in S. I have discussed S primarily in terms of desires, and this term can be used, formally, for all elements in S. But this terminology may make one forget **that S can contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent. Above all, there is of course no supposition that the desires or projects of an agent have to be egoistic**; he will, one hopes, have non-egoistic projects of various kinds, and these equally can provide internal reasons for action.” (“*Internal and external reasons”*, in MDP, p. 365) [sublinhado meu]

5. “There are no fixed boundaries on the continuum from rational thought to inspiration and conversion”.

6. “If it were right to assume that a new true belief to the effect that one has a reason, and the associated motivation, would need to be reachable by a rational procedure, this would be a convincing argument for the restriction to internal reasons. It is plausible that something on the lines of Williams’s sketch of deliberation exhausts the possibilities for acquiring new motivations by rational thinking.” (“Response to Pettit and Smith”, in *McDowell and his critics*, p. 176)

7. “o que a racionalidade prática requer de um agente não é simplesmente tirado/decalcado das suas motivações específicas, tal como elas lhe aparecem (incluindo, no exemplo, o desejo do agente de beber alguma coisa que na realidade é petróleo), mas é determinado, *a partir dessas motivações*, pela deliberação, cuja capacidade de corrigir e enriquecer as motivações específicas de que o agente parte deixa em aberto a necessária distância entre o actual e o ideal.” (“Might there be external reasons?”, p. 105). [tradução minha]

**Referências:**

Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons”, in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard e P. Railton (eds.), *Moral Discourse and Practice*, Oxford University Press, 1997.

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