**Citações** (4)

1. “Robert Boyle and John Locke called colours ‘secondary qualities’, meaning that colours as they occur in material things consist simply in patterns of arrangement and movement of minute particles on the surfaces of objects, (…) and do enable these objects to produce colour sensations in us, but that colours as we see them do not literally belong to the surfaces of material things.” (J. L. Mackie, *Ethics* *– Inventing right and wrong* , pp. 19-20)
2. “A secondary quality is a property the ascription of which to an object is not adequately understood except as true, if it is true, in virtue of the object’s disposition to present a certain sort of perceptual appearance” (J. McDowell, “Values and secondary qualities”, p. 133).
3. “Secondary-quality experience presents itself as perceptual awareness of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one. (…) so, notwithstanding the conceptual connection between being red and being experienced as red, an experience of something as red can count as a case of being presented with a property that is there anyway – there independently of the experience itself.” (J. McDowell, p. 134)
4. “…two notions that we must insist on keeping separate: first, the possible veridicality of experience (the objectivity of its object, in the second of the two senses I distinguished), in respect of which primary and secondary qualities are on all fours; and, second, the not essentially phenomenal character of some properties that experience represents objects as having (…), which marks off the primary perceptible qualities from the secondary ones.” (J. McDowell, p. 139)
5. “We get the notion of something’s being objectively good, or having intrinsic value, by reversing the direction of dependence here, by making the desire depend upon the goodness, instead of the goodness on the desire. (…) It is fairly easy to confuse the way in which a thing’s desirability is indeed objective with its having in our sense objective value.” (J. L. Mackie, *Ethics – Inventing right and wrong*, p. 43)
6. “For an object to merit fear just is for it to be fearful. So explanations of fear that manifest our capacity to understand ourselves in this region of our lives will simply not cohere with the claim that reality contains nothing in the way of fearfulness.” (J. McDowell, p. 144)

**Referências:**

J. L. Mackie, *Ethics: inventing right and wrong*, Penguin, 1977.

John McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities”, in J. McDowell, *Mind Value and Reality*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.